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ABSTRACT Due to the massive growth of data and security concerns, data of patients would be encrypted
and outsourced to the cloud server for feature matching in various medical scenarios, such as personal health
record systems, actuarial judgments and diagnostic related groups. Public key encryption with equality
test (PKEET) is a useful utility for encrypted feature matching. Authorized tester could perform data
matching on encrypted data without decrypting. Unfortunately, due to the limited terminology in medicine,
people within institutions may illegally use data, trying to obtain information through traversal methods.
In this paper we propose a new PKEET notion, called public-key authenticated encryption with designated
equality test (PKAE-DET), which could resist this kind of attacks launched by an inside adversary, known
as offline message recovery attacks (OMRA). We propose a concrete construction of PKAE-DET, which
only requires one single server to perform the feature matching job securely, and does not require any group
mechanism. We prove its security based on some simple mathematical assumptions. Experimental results
show that our scheme has efficiency comparable with those PKEET schemes which do not resist OMRA
attacks or require group mechanism. We further show how our scheme could be effectively used in diagnostic
related groups in medicine, demonstrating its practicability.
INDEX TERMS Public key encryption, equality test, message recovery attack, cloud storage, data sharing.

I. INTRODUCTION

The development of cloud computing technology provides
more efficient and reliable data management with less error
to us, and the service quality of traditional industries has been
effectively improved. One of the most prominent manifestations is cloud-based electronic medical systems [1], [2].
Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG) constitutes an approach
to measuring hospital case mix, which may be understood
as a system for separating hospitalized patients into unique
groups based on their diagnoses and procedures [3]. According to diagnoses, procedures, age, sex, discharge status, and
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Junggab Son.
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the presence of complications or comorbidities, patients are
divided into different diagnosis related groups, which are
scientifically calculated on the basis of classification and
given an advanced payment. This kind of payment method
takes care of the interests of patients, hospitals, medical
insurances and other aspects, and becomes the most important
cost control and quality improvement tool that governments
and private payers have implemented [4].
Due to the rapid growth of medical data and low maintenance cost demand, hospitals would prefer to store patients’
medical records onto cloud servers. However, cloud servers
are usually provided by third-party providers rather than
hospitals themselves. Due to the high sensitiveness and privacy of patients’ data, hospitals would encrypt them before
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uploading. However, it brings new challenges. Once the data
is encrypted, its structure is completely hidden. Search operations over plaintext becomes invalid.
Searchable encryption (SE) was thus proposed to solve
this problem effectively, and has attracted wide attentions
since its introduction. It allows users to store a large group
of encrypted documents on the cloud server and to perform
keyword-based searches over these encrypted documents.
The server cannot get further information except for specific
patterns. SE could be divided into two categories: symmetric
searchable encryption (SSE) [5] and public-key encryption
with keyword search (PEKS) [6].
In 2010 a new encryption primitive named public-key
encryption with equality test (PKEET) [7] was introduced,
which could be viewed as a variant of PEKS. PKEET is
designed to be used in specific situations, since it allows
the tester to check whether two ciphertexts generated under
different public keys contain the same plaintext without
decryption.
As shown in Figure 1, PKEET can be used in DRG
systems, personal health record systems, and other medical
systems. (Please refer to Sect. VII for a more detailed explanation.) Since patients within each category are clinically
similar and are expected to use the same level of hospital
resources [8], patients’ medical records can be encrypted and
compared with the encrypted criterions in the system to determine which category the patient’s illness should correspond
to. However, due to privacy issue, it is necessary to prevent
outside or inside personnel from illegally using the data for

FIGURE 1. System model of PKEET.
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FIGURE 2. Offline message recovery attack, OMRA.

operations beyond the authorization. Compared with outside
adversaries, it is harder to guard patients’ data against inside
adversaries, which are able to launch offline message recovery
attacks (OMRA).
A. OFFLINE MESSAGE RECOVERY ATTACK

Offline message recovery attack (OMRA) is an inside attack
proposed by Tang [9], in which an inside adversary would
be able to recover the plaintext from a given ciphertext. The
inside adversary refers an insider who can easily obtain the
trapdoor, such as a database administrator in the hospital.
It wants to obtain the patient’s privacy information in order
to gain benefits.
Figure 2 shows the flow chart of OMRA. To recover the
message m encapsulted in ciphertext C w.r.t. public key pk,
an OMRA adversary, which is given a trapdoor td as the
authorization to test over C, works as follows:
1) generates a new key pair (pk 0 , sk 0 );
2) randomly chooses a new message m0i from the message
space, and encrypted m0i under pk 0 to get ciphertext Ci0 ;
3) uses sk 0 to produce a trapdoor td 0 w.r.t. pk 0 ;
4) runs the test algorithm on input (td, C, td 0 , Ci0 ) to check
if C and Ci0 contain the message; and
5) outputs m0i if the test returns 1, and goes to Step 2) otherwise.
Theoretically, we assume the plaintext space to be at least
super-logarithmically large. However, in practice, especially
in medicine, all data are certain medical words, and the frequency of each word is uneven. The occurrence probabilities
of some common disease-related words are high, and the
others are low. Therefore, it is feasible for an inside adversary
to launch and finish the attack above in a reasonable time
and recovers m from C, even if the adversary has limited
computational power.
In this regard, Tang [9] proposed a PKEET scheme that can
resist OMRA attack. However, their scheme needs to work
in dual-server setting, which requires high computation and
communication costs, and assumes that the two servers do
VOLUME 7, 2019
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not collude. Therefore, it is necessary to construct a PKEET
scheme that is secure against OMRA attack and works in the
single-server setting.
B. RELATED WORKS
1) PKEET

The notion of PKEET was introduced by Yang et al. [7]
in CT-RSA 2010, which extended public key encryption by
adding a test algorithm to compare the data encrypted under
different public keys without decryption. It has attracted
extensive attentions. Since the scheme of Yang et al. [7]
has no authorization mechanism, everyone could compare
encrypted data. Tang et al. [10] proposed an FG-PKEET
scheme, in which the server can only perform the ciphertext comparison after obtaining the trapdoor generated by
two users together. Subsequently, Tang et al. proposed an
AoN-PKEET scheme [11] and an ADG-PKEET scheme [9]
to improve the authorization mechanism. The former requires
that the test obtains trapdoors from both users, with which it
can compare all ciphertexts of them. The latter is an extension of FG-PKEET, which resists OMRA attacks via the
dual-server method, but needs to make double agent agreement to interact, and thus requiring higher computation costs.
Ma et al. [12] proposed a PKE-DET scheme by delegating
the comparison to a third party to ensure that only the designated server could use the trapdoor to compare ciphertexts.
Huang et al. [13] proposed a PKE-AET scheme, which supports two authorization patterns, e.g. comparing either all
ciphertexts or some specific ciphertexts of users, respectively. Ma et al. [14] introduced PKEET-FA scheme, supporting four types of authorization patterns. Xu et al. [15]
proposed a verifiable PKEET scheme, which supports two
other authorization patterns different from those in [14],
and in the meanwhile supports the verification of calculated
results.
In order to solve the problem of certificate management,
[16]–[20] proposed schemes of identity-based encryption
with equality test (IBEET) by combining PKEET and IBE.
Besides, [21]–[24] proposed schemes of attribute-based
encryption with equality test (ABEET) in order to achieve
more flexible authorization, which is a combination of
PKEET and ABE. These researches increase the security and
further extend the application scenarios of PKEET.
2) OMRA AND IKGA

Tang [9] proposed to use dual servers to resist OMRA attacks.
The same method is also used in [25], [26]. It assumes that the
servers do not collude and requires additional communication
between the servers. Relatively, [27], [28] proposed to share a
secret among group members only with which can a member
generate a valid ciphertext legally. It is more efficient than
the aforementioned dual-server schemes. However, the group
creation takes time, and there is a risk of leaking the shared
secret. If a group member colludes with the server, they can
still launch the OMRA attack.
VOLUME 7, 2019

OMRA is similar with the inside keyword guessing attack
(IKGA) against public key searchable encryption. In both
of the attacks, a malicious server with the trapdoor tries to
guess the message from a given ciphertext. Schemes secure
against IKGA can be roughly divided into two categories.
The first category [29]–[31] works in the dual-server setting,
but requires additional communication overhead. The second
category [32], [33] adopts to use the sender’s private key
to encrypt a message. In all these schemes (of the second
category), the sender is also able to generate a trapdoor.
It would cause security issues if we directly apply this method
in PKEET.
C. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS

In this work we study how to construct an efficient PKEET
scheme resisting OMRA attacks in the single-server setting.
Concretely, we make the following contributions:
1) We propose a new notion of public-key authenticated
encryption with designated equality test (PKAE-DET),
which to the best of our knowledge, is the first PKEET
scheme that is secure against OMRA attacks and does
not require the dual-server setting or the group mechanism. In PKAE-DET, the sender specifies who is
responsible to test ciphertexts while encrypting a message, in order to prevent outside adversaries from testing. The receiver specifies the sender and the target
user to compare with while generating the trapdoor,
in order to prevent inside adversaries from abusing the
authorization.
2) We propose a concrete construction of PKAE-DET
which makes use of an asymmetric bilinear pairing,
and prove its security based on simple mathematical
assumptions (e.g. (decisional) Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
assumption, symmetric external Diffie-Hellman
assumption) under the given security models. Experimental results show that our scheme has efficient
comparable with previous PKEET schemes.
3) We further show how our PKAE-DET scheme could be
used in applications like DRG, thus demonstrating the
usability and practicability of our scheme.
D. PAPER ORGANIZATION

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. II,
we introduce some cryptographic preliminaries. In Sect. III
we describe the formal definition and security models
of PKAE-DET. The concrete construction is proposed in
Sect. IV, and its security analysis is provided in Sect. V.
In Sect. VI we present the performance evaluation and comparison of our PKAE-DET scheme and other related PKEET
schemes. We then show the application of our scheme in DRG
in Sect. VII, and conclude the paper in Sect. VIII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. BILINEAR PAIRING

Let G1 , G2 and GT be groups of prime order p. A bilinear
pairing ê : G1 × G2 → GT satisfies the following properties.
136001
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•
•
•

Bilinearity: For any X ∈ G1 , Y ∈ G2 and any a, b ∈ Z,
ê(X a , Y b ) = ê(X , Y )a·b .
Non-degeneracy: If g and h are generators of G1 and G2 ,
respectively, ê(g, h) 6 = 1GT .
Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute ê(X , Y ) for any X ∈ G1 , Y ∈ G2 .

B. BILINEAR DIFFIE-HELLMAN (BDH) ASSUMPTION

Let G1 , G2 , GT , ê and p be defined as above, and g1 , g2
be generators of G1 and G2 , respectively. Given the tuple
R
(g1 , g2 , ga1 , gb1 , gb2 , gc2 ) where a, b, c ← Z∗p , we say BDH
assumption holds if for any probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) algorithm A, it computes ê(g1 , g2 )a·b·c with only negligible probability.
C. SYMMETRIC eXternal DIFFIE-HELLMAN (SXDH)
ASSUMPTION
R

Given a tuple (g, ga , gb , gr ) where a, b, r ← Z∗p , we say
decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds if for any
PPT algorithm A, it decides whether gr = ga·b with probability only negligibly larger 1/2. The SXDH assumptions holds
if DDH assumption holds in both G1 and G2 .
D. DECISIONAL BILINEAR DIFFIE-HELLMAN (DBDH)
ASSUMPTION

Let G1 , G2 , GT , ê, p, g1 and g2 be defined as above. Given
R
a tuple (g1 , g2 , ga1 , gb1 , gb2 , gc2 , ê(g1 , g2 )r ) where a, b, c, r ←
Z∗p , we say DBDH assumption holds if for any PPT algorithm A, it decides whether ê(g1 , g2 )r = ê(g1 , g2 )a·b·c with
probability only negligibly larger 1/2.
III. PUBLIC-KEY AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION WITH
DESIGNATED EQUALITY TEST
A. DEFINITION

A public-key authenticated encryption with designated equality test (PKAE-DET) scheme is defined by the following (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms.
• pp ← Setup(1λ ): Given the security parameter 1λ ,
returns system public parameter pp.
• (pkS , skS ) ← KeyGenSender (pp): Given system public parameter pp, returns the sender’s public/secret key
pair(pkS , skS ).
• (pkR , skR ) ← KeyGenReceiver (pp): Given system public
parameter pp, returns the receiver’s public/secret key
pair(pkR , skR ).
• (pkT , skT ) ← KeyGenTester (pp): Given system public parameter pp, returns the tester’s public/secret key
pair(pkT , skT ).
• C ← Enc(skS , pkR , pkT , M ): Given a sender’s secret
key skS , a receiver’s public key pkR , the tester’s public
key pkT and a message M , returns a ciphertext C.
• M ← Dec(skR , pkS , pkR , pkT , C): Given a receiver’s
secret key skR and a ciphertext C, returns a message M
or ⊥ indicating decryption failure.
136002

Td ← Aut(skR , pkS , pkR0 ): Given a receiver’s secret key
skR , a sender’s public key pkS and a targeted receiver’s
public key pkR0 , returns a trapdoor Td as the authorization for test.
• result ← Test(C, Td, C 0 , Td 0 , pkR , pkR0 , skT ): Given
two ciphertexts C and C 0 , two trapdoors Td and Td 0 , two
receivers’ public key pkR and pkR0 , and the tester’s secret
key skT , returns 1 if C and C 0 contain the same message,
and 0 otherwise.
To prevent outside adversaries, it is necessary to designate
the tester during the generation of a ciphertext. In addition,
in applications like DRG, we need to prevent an inside adversary from generating ciphertexts on behalf of the sender,
or comparing the legitimate receiver’s ciphertexts with others
if it is not authorized to do so. Therefore, the encryption algorithm of PKAE-DET takes the tester’s public key as input,
while the trapdoor generation algorithm takes the sender’s
public key and the public key of another receiver for ciphertext comparison as input. That is, the receiver needs to specify
whose ciphertexts the tester could compare its ciphertexts
with.
•

B. SECURITY MODELS

Game I: One-wayness under chosen ciphertext attacks
(OW-CCA): With authorization from the receiver, the adversary A (which could be the tester) should not be able to
recover the message from a given ciphertext. Consider the
following game.
1) Setup: The challenger C generates system public
parameter pp, nS key pairs of senders (pkSi , skSi ), 1 ≤
i ≤ nS , nR key pairs of receivers (pkRj , skRj ), 1 ≤ j ≤
nR , and a key pair (pkT , skT ) of the tester. It sends pp,
{pkSi }, {pkRi } and (pkT , skT ) to A.
2) Phase 1: A is allowed to issue the following queries for
polynomially many times:
• Key Query(i): Given an index i of a sender or
receiver, the oracle returns the secret key ski .
• Decryption Query(i, j, C): Given index i of a
sender, j of a receiver and a ciphertext C, the oracle
returns the corresponding message M .
• Authorization Query(i, j, k): Given index i of a
sender, j of a receiver and k of another receiver
aiming to compare with, the oracle computes and
returns the trapdoor Td.
3) Challenge: A specifies a challenge sender S ∗ and a
challenge receiver R∗ . C randomly chooses a message
M ∗ , computes C ∗ ← Enc(skS ∗ , pkR∗ , pkT , M ∗ ) and
returns C ∗ to A.
4) Phase 2: A continues to issue queries as in Phase 1.
5) Guess: A outputs M 0 , and wins the game if M 0 = M ∗
and
a) R∗ was not issued as a key query;
b) (·, R∗ , C ∗ ) was not issued as a decryption query;
c) (S ∗ , R∗ , ·) was not issued as an authorization
query.
VOLUME 7, 2019
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The advantage of A in the game above is defined to be its
probability of winning the game, e.g. AdvOW-CCA
(1λ ) =
A
0
∗
Pr[M = M ]. We have the following definition.
Definition 1 (OW-CCA Security): A PKAE-DET scheme
satisfies OW-CCA security if for any PPT adversary A, its
advantage AdvOW-CCA
(1λ ) is negligible.
A
Game II: Indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA): Without authorization from the
receiver, the adversary A (which could be the tester) should
be not able to obtain even one-bit information about the
message from a ciphertext. Consider the following game.
1) Setup: Same as that in Game I.
2) Phase 1: A is allowed to issue key queries and decryption queries as in Game I for polynomially many times.
3) Challenge: A specifies a challenge sender S ∗ , a challenge receiver R∗ , and two challenge message M0∗ and
M1∗ of the same length. C randomly selects a bit b ∈
{0, 1}, computes C ∗ ← Enc(skS ∗ , pkR∗ , pkT , Mb∗ ) and
returns C ∗ to A.
4) Phase 2: Same as that in Phase 1.
5) Guess: A outputs a bit b0 , and wins the game if b0 = b
and
a) neither R∗ nor S ∗ was issued as a key query;
b) neither (·, R∗ , ·) nor (·, S ∗ , ·) was issued as a
decryption query.
The advantage of A in the game above is defined to be
AdvIND-CCA
(1λ ) = |Pr[b0 = b] − 21 |. We have the following
A
definition.
Definition 2 (IND-CCA Security): A PKAE-DET scheme
satisfies IND-CCA security if for any PPT adversary A, its
advantage AdvIND-CCA
(1λ ) is negligible.
A
Game III: Designated testability under chosen ciphertext attacks (DT-CCA): Without authorization from the
receiver, the adversary A without secret key of the tester,
should not be able to obtain even one-bit information about
the message from a ciphertext. Consider the following game.
1) Setup: The adversary A submits the index R∗ of its
challenge receiver. The challenger C generates system
public parameter pp, nS key pairs of senders (pkSi , skSi ),
nR key pairs of receivers (pkRi , skRi ), and a key pair of
the tester (pkT , skT ). It sends pp, {pkSi }, {pkRi } and pkT
to A.
2) Phase 1: A is allowed to issue key queries, decryption
queries and authorization queries as in Game I. Furthermore, it is also allowed to issue the following queries:
• Test Query(C, Td, C 0 , Td 0 , i, j, k, l): Given ciphertexts C, C 0 , trapdoors Td,Td 0 ,indices of two
senders i,j and indices of two receivers k, l, the oracle computes and returns the test result.
3) Challenge: A specifies a challenge sender S ∗ , and two
challenge message M0∗ and M1∗ of the same length. C
randomly selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, computes C ∗ ←
Enc(skS ∗ , pkR∗ , pkT , Mb∗ ) and returns C ∗ to A.
4) Phase 2: Same as that in Phase 1.
5) Guess: A outputs a bit b0 , and wins the game if b0 = b
and
VOLUME 7, 2019

a) R∗ was not issued as a key query;
b) (·, R∗ , ·) was not issued as a decryption query;
c) neither (·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, R∗ , ·) nor (·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, R∗ )
was issued as a test query.
The advantage of A in the game above is defined to be
AdvDT-CCA
(1λ ) = |Pr[b0 = b] − 12 |. We have the following
A
definition.
Definition 3 (DT-CCA Security): A PKAE-DET scheme
satisfies DT-CCA security if for any PPT adversary A, its
advantage AdvDT-CCA
(1λ ) is negligible.
A
IV. CONSTRUCTION

In this part we present our PKAE-DET scheme. It works as
below.
1) Setup(1λ ): The algorithm generates bilinear group
parameters (G1 , G2 , GT , ê, p), chooses two random
R
generators g ∈ G1 , h ∈ G2 , and selects f ← G2 .
It then selects hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p , H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}lm +lp , H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}lg , where
lm is maximum length of a message, lp and lg are the
representation length of an element of group Z∗p and
G1 , respectively. It publishes system public parameter
pp = (G1 , G2 , GT , p, g, h, f , ê, H1 , H2 , H3 ).
R
2) KeyGenSender (pp): The algorithm selects s ← Z∗p and
outputs pkS = gs , skS = s.
R
3) KeyGenReceiver (pp): The algorithm selects r, w ←
3
1
2
4
∗
Zp and outputs pkR = (pkR , pkR , pkR , pkR ) =
(gr , gw , hw , hv ), skR = (skR1 , skR2 , skR3 ) = (r, w, v).
R

4) KeyGenTester (pp): The algorithm selects t ← Z∗p and
outputs pkT = (pkT1 , pkT2 ) = (gt , ht ), skT = t.
5) Enc(skS , pkR , pkT , M ): The algorithm selects α,
R
β ← Z∗p and generates a ciphertext C :=
(C1 , C2 , C3 , C4 , C5 ) as follows.
α

C1 = g H1 (M ) · (pkR1 )skS ⊕ H3 (ê(pkT1 , pkR4 )β )
α

= g H1 (M ) · gr·s ⊕ H3 (ê(gt , hv )β ),
C2 = (pkT2 )α = ht·α ,

C3 = (pkR3 )α = hw·α ,

C4 = (M kα) ⊕ H2 (C1 kC2 kC3 kC5 kê(pkR2 , f )β ),
= (M kα) ⊕ H2 (C1 kC2 kC3 kC5 kê(gw , f )β ),

C5 = gβ .
6) Dec(skR , pkS , pkR , pkT , C): The algorithm computes
2

(M kα) = C4 ⊕ H2 (C1 kC2 kC3 kC5 kê(C5 , f )skR )
= C4 ⊕ H2 (C1 kC2 kC3 kC5 kê(gβ , f )w ),
3

E = H3 (ê(C5 , pkT2 )skR ).
It returns M if (pkR3 )α = C3 and
skR1 ·H1 (M )

(C1 ⊕ E)H1 (M ) = gα · pkS

,

and ⊥ otherwise.
7) Aut(skR , pkS , pkR0 ): The algorithm computes and
returns
1

0

Td = ((pkS ) · (pkR20 ))skR = gs·r · gw ·r .
136003

Y. Wang et al.: PKAE-DET and Its Applications in DRG

8) Test(C, Td, C 0 , Td 0 , pkR , pkR0 , skT ): The test algorithm computes as follows.
D1 = C1 ⊕ H3 (ê(C5 , pkR4 )t ),
D1 0 = C1 0 ⊕ H3 (ê(C5 0 , pkR40 )t ),
α·α 0 ·t
D1
T = ê( , C2 0 ) · ê(pkR1 , C3 0 )skT = ê(g, h) H1 (M ) ,
Td
α·α 0 ·t
D1 0
0
0
T = ê( 0 , C2 ) · ê(pkR1 , C3 )skT = ê(g, h) H1 (M 0 ) .
Td
It returns 1 if T = T 0 holds, indicating M = M 0 , and
0 otherwise.
Correctness of our scheme could be verified in a straightforward way, so we omit it here.

•

α

C1∗ = g H1 (M ∗ ) · (pkR1∗ )skS ∗ ⊕ H3 (ê(pkT1 , pkR4∗ )β )
α

= g H1 (M ∗ ) · gr
C4∗

In this part we prove the security of our PKAE-DET scheme
under the given models via a series of games. Below we use Si
to denote the event that the adversary wins in Game i.

Theorem 1 (OW-CCA): If BDH assumption holds, our
PKAE-DET scheme above is OW-CCA secure in the random
oracle model.
Proof 1: Let A be a PPT adversary against OW-CCA
security of our PKAE-DET scheme. Consider the following
games.
Game 1.0:
• Setup: The challenger C generates system public parameter pp = (G1 , G2 , GT , p, g, h, f , ê, H1 , H2 , H3 ), nS key
pairs of senders (pkSi , skSi ), nR key pairs of receivers
(pkRj , skRj ), and a key pair (pkT , skT ) of the tester. Then
C sends pp, {pkSi }, {pkRi } and (pkT , skT ) to A.
• Phase 1: A is allowed to issue the following queries for
polynomially many times:
– H1 Hash Query(M ): Given a message M , if M has
not been queried, the oracle returns a random element H1 (M ) = h1 ← Z∗p , and stores (M , H1 (M ))
in the List L1 which is initially empty. Otherwise,
it returns the corresponding answer from List L1 .
– H2 Hash Query(T ): Given an input T , if T has not
been queried, the oracle returns a random element
H2 (T ) = h2 ← {0, 1}lm +lp , and stores (T , H2 (T ))
in the List L2 which is initially empty. Otherwise,
it returns the corresponding answer from List L2 .
– H3 Hash Query(T ): Given an input T , if T has not
been queried, the oracle returns a random element
H3 (T ) = h3 ← {0, 1}lg , and stores (T , H3 (T ))
in the List L3 which is initially empty. Otherwise,
it returns the corresponding answer from List L3 .
– Key Query(i): Given index i of a sender (resp.
a receiver), the oracle returns the secret key skSi
(resp. skRi ).
– Decryption Query(i, j, C): Given index i of a
sender, j of a receiver and a ciphertext C, the oracle runs Dec(skj , pki , pkj , pkT , C) and returns the
136004

∗ ·s∗

⊕ H3 (ê(gt , hv )β ),
∗

C2∗ = (pkT2 )α = ht·α ,

V. SECURITY ANALYSIS

A. OW-CCA SECURITY

corresponding message M or ⊥ indicating query
failure.
– Authorization Query(i, j, k): Given index i of
a sender, j of a receiver and k of another
receiver aiming to compare with, the oracle runs
Aut(ski , pkj , pkk ) and returns the trapdoor Td.
Challenge: A specifies a challenge sender S ∗ and a challenge receiver R∗ . C randomly chooses a message M ∗ ,
R
selects α, β ← Z∗p , computes and returns C ∗ =
(C1∗ , C2∗ , C3∗ , C4∗ , C5∗ ) to A, where

=
=

C5∗

C3∗ = (pkR3∗ )α = hw

∗ ·α

,

(M kα) ⊕ H2 (C1∗ kC2∗ kC3∗ kC5∗ kê(pkR2∗ , f )β )
∗
(M ∗ kα) ⊕ H2 (C1∗ kC2∗ kC3∗ kC5∗ kê(gw , f )β ),
β
∗

=g .

Phase 2: A continues to issue queries as in Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs M 0 , and wins the game if M 0 = M ∗
and
1) R∗ was not issued as a key query;
2) (·, R∗ , C ∗ ) was not issued as a decryption query;
3) (S ∗ , R∗ , ·) was not issued as an authorization query.
The advantage of A in the game is
•

•

AdvOW-CCA
(1λ ) = Pr[S1.0 ] = Pr[M 0 = M ∗ ].
A
Game 1.1: This game is almost the same as Game 1.0,
except the decryption oracle.
• Decryption Query(i, j, C): Given index i of a sender, j of
a receiver and a ciphertext C, the oracle retrieves tuples
(T , H2 (T )) from List L2 with T = (C1 kC2 kC3 kC5 k·).
For each tuple it computes (M kα) ← H2 (T ) ⊕ C4 , and
returns M if (pkj3 )α = C3 and
3

skj1 ·H1 (M )

(C1 ⊕ H3 (ê(C5 , pkT2 )skj ))H1 (M ) = gα · pki

.

If no tuple satisfies the conditions above, it returns ⊥.
Obviously, the probability that A correctly gets the output of
H2 without asking the oracle is negligible. So we have:
|Pr[S1.1 ] − Pr[S1.0 ]| ≤ negl(1λ ).
Game 1.2: It is almost the same as Game 1.1, except the
generation of C4∗ . In this game C selects a random element
W1∗ ∈ GT , computes C4∗ as
C4∗ = (M ∗ kα) ⊕ H2 (C1∗ kC2∗ kC3∗ kC5∗ kW1∗ ),
and adds ((C1∗ kC2∗ kC3∗ kC5∗ kW1∗ ), C4∗ ⊕ (M ∗ kα)) to List L2 .
Denote by E1 the event that A queried (C1∗ kC2∗ kC3∗ kC5∗ k
∗
ê(gw , f )β ) to H2 hash oracle. Game 1.2 is identical to Game
1.1 if E1 does not occur. So we have
|Pr[S1.2 ] − Pr[S1.1 ]| ≤ Pr[E1 ].
VOLUME 7, 2019

Y. Wang et al.: PKAE-DET and Its Applications in DRG

R

bit b ∈ {0, 1}, selects α, β ← Z∗p , computes and returns
C ∗ = (C1∗ , C2∗ , C3∗ , C4∗ , C5∗ ) to A, where

Due to the intractability of BDH problem, it is hard for A to
∗
compute ê(gw , f )β . Therefore, we have that
Pr[E1 ] ≤ negl(1λ ).

Game 1.4: It is almost the same as Game 1.3, except the
generation of C4∗ . Now C simply sets C4∗ as a random element
W3∗ of length lm + lp . It is obvious that
Pr[S1.4 ] = Pr[S1.3 ].
Notice that in this game C2∗ , C3∗ , C4∗ and C5∗ are all random
in the view of A, and C1∗ is the only ciphertext component
containing M ∗ . Since M ∗ is randomly chosen and H1 is
modeled as an oracle, the probability that A successfully
recovers M ∗ from C1∗ is thus negligible. That is,
λ

Pr[S1.4 ] ≤ negl(1 ).
Combining all the claims above, we have that:
OW-CCA

AdvA

C4∗
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C3∗ = (pkR3∗ )α = hw

∗ ·α

,

(Mb∗ kα) ⊕ H2 (C1∗ kC2∗ kC3∗ kC5∗ kê(pkR2∗ , f )β )
∗
(Mb∗ kα) ⊕ H2 (C1∗ kC2∗ kC3∗ kC5∗ kê(gw , f )β ),
β

=g .

1
1
AdvIND-CCA
(1λ ) = |Pr[S2.0 ] − | = |Pr[b0 = b] − |.
A
2
2
We proceed by modifying Game 2.0 in the same way as in
the proof of Theorem 1, and obtain Game 2.1 to Game 2.4.
We have that
Pr[S2.0 ] ≤ Pr[S2.4 ] + Pr[E1 ] + negl(1λ ).
Game 2.5: We further modify Game 2.4, and replace
(pkR1∗ )skS ∗ with a random element W4∗ ∈ G1 in the computation of C1∗ . Now the challenge ciphertext C ∗ is computed
as follows.
α

C1∗ = g H1 (Mb ) · W4∗ ⊕ H3 (ê(gt , hv )β ),
∗

∗

C2∗ = ht·α ,
C4∗

=

C3∗ = hw

W3∗ ,
r∗

C5∗
s∗

∗ ·α

,

β

=g .

r ∗ ·s∗

Given a tuple (g, g , g ), g
and W4∗ are indistinguishable
to A under the SXDH assumption. Therefore, we have
|Pr[S2.5 ] − Pr[S2.4 ]| ≤ negl(1λ ).

≤ negl(1λ ).

Theorem 2 (IND-CCA): If BDH and SXDH assumptions
hold, Our PKAE-DET scheme above is IND-CCA secure in
the random oracle model.
Proof 2: Consider the following games, where A is a
PPT adversary against IND-CCA security of our scheme.
Game 2.0:
• Setup: Same as that in Game 1.0.
• Phase 1: A is allowed to issue H1 , H2 , H3 queries,
key queries and decryption queries as in Game 1.0 for
polynomially many times.
• Challenge: A specifies a challenge sender S ∗ , a challenge receiver R∗ , and two challenge messages M0∗
and M1∗ of the same length. C randomly selects a

∗

Phase 2: A continues to issue queries as in Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a bit b0 , and wins the game if b0 = b
and
1) neither R∗ nor S ∗ was issued as a key query;
2) neither (·, R∗ , ·) nor (·, S ∗ , ·) was issued as a
decryption query.
The advantage of A in the game is

≤ Pr[S1.2 ] + Pr[E1 ] + negl(1λ )

B. IND-CCA SECURITY

⊕ H3 (ê(gt , hv )β ),

∗ ·s∗

•

≤ Pr[S1.1 ] + negl(1λ )

This completes the proof.

∗

•

(1 ) = Pr[S1.0 ]

= Pr[S1.4 ] + Pr[E1 ] + negl(1λ )

=
=

C5∗

λ

= Pr[S1.3 ] + Pr[E1 ] + negl(1λ )

α

C2∗ = (pkT2 )α = ht·α ,

C4∗ = (M ∗ kα) ⊕ W2∗ .

Pr[S1.3 ] = Pr[S1.2 ].

∗

= g H1 (Mb ) · gr

Game 1.3: It is almost the same as Game 1.2, except the
generation of C4∗ . Now C computes C4 as

The only difference is that a random string W2∗ is used to
replace H2 (C1∗ kC2∗ kC3∗ kC5∗ kW1∗ ) in the computation of C4∗ .
Since W1∗ is random, the output of H2 is also random. Hence,
the change does not make difference to the advantage of A,
and we have that

α

C1∗ = g H1 (Mb ) · (pkR1∗ )skS ∗ ⊕ H3 (ê(pkT1 , pkR4∗ )β )

Game 2.6: We modify the generation of C ∗ as follows:
C1∗ = W5∗ ,
C4∗

=

W3∗ ,

C2∗ = ht·α ,
C5∗

β

C3∗ = hw

∗ ·α

,

=g .

W4∗

Since
is random, we have that C1∗ is also random.
Therefore, the replacement of C1∗ with a random element
of the same length makes no difference to the adversary’s
advantage. That is,
Pr[S2.6 ] = Pr[S2.5 ].
Notice that in this game the whole challenge ciphertext C ∗
is random in the view of A, and does not leak any information
about the bit b. Therefore, A wins in Game 2.6 with probability at most 1/2. That is,
Pr[S2.6 ] =

1
.
2
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3) neither (·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, R∗ , ·) nor (·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, R∗ )
was issued as a test query.
The advantage of A in the game is

Combining the claims above, we have that
1
AdvIND-CCA
(1λ ) = |Pr[S2.0 ] − |
A
2
1
≤ |Pr[S2.4 ] + Pr[E1 ] + negl(1λ ) − |
2
1
λ
≤ |Pr[S2.5 ] + Pr[E1 ] + negl(1 ) − |
2
1
= |Pr[S2.6 ] + Pr[E1 ] + negl(1λ ) − |
2
= |Pr[E1 ] + negl(1λ )| ≤ negl(1λ ).
This completes the proof.
C. DT-CCA SECURITY

Theorem 3 (DT-CCA): If BDH and DBDH assumption
holds, our PKAE-DET scheme above is DT-CCA secure in
the random oracle model.
Proof 3: Let A be a PPT adversary against DT-CCA
security of our PKAE-DET scheme. Consider the following
games.
Game 3.0:
• Setup: A submits the index R∗ of its challenge receiver.
The challenger C generates and sets system public
parameter pp = (G1 , G2 , GT , p, g, h, f , ê, H1 , H2 , H3 ),
nS key pairs of senders (pkSi , skSi ), nR key pairs of
receivers (pkRi , skRi ), and a key pair of the tester
(pkT , skT ). C sends pp, {pkSi }, {pkRi } and pkT to A.
• Phase 1: A is allowed to issue queries as in Game
1.0 for polynomially many times. Furthermore, it is also
allowed to issue the following queries:
– Test Query(C, Td, C 0 , Td 0 , i, j, k, l): Given ciphertexts C, C 0 , trapdoors Td,Td 0 , indices of two
senders i, j and indices of two receivers k, l, the oracle computes M = Dec(skk , pki , pkk , pkT , C).
M 0 = Dec(skl , pkj , pkl , pkT , C), and returns 1 if
M = M 0 , and 0 otherwise.
• Challenge: A specifies a challenge sender S ∗ and two
challenge message M0∗ and M1∗ of the same length. C
R

randomly selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, selects α, β ← Z∗p ,
computes and returns C ∗ = (C1∗ , C2∗ , C3∗ , C4∗ , C5∗ ) to A,
where
α

∗

α

∗

C1∗ = g H1 (Mb ) · (pkR1∗ )skS ∗ ⊕ H3 (ê(pkT1 , pkR4∗ )β )
= g H1 (Mb ) · gr

∗ ·s∗

C2∗ = (pkT2 )α = ht·α ,

⊕ H3 (ê(gt , hv )β ),
∗

C3∗ = (pkR3∗ )α = hw

∗ ·α

,

C4∗ = (Mb∗ kα) ⊕ H2 (C1∗ kC2∗ kC3∗ kC5∗ kê(pkR2∗ , f )β )
= (Mb∗ kα) ⊕ H2 (C1∗ kC2∗ kC3∗ kC5∗ kê(gw , f )β ),
∗

C5∗
•
•

β

=g .

Phase 2: A continues to issue queries as in Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a bit b0 , and wins the game if b0 = b
and
1) R∗ was not issued as a key query;
2) (·, R∗ , ·) was not issued as a decryption query;
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1
1
AdvDT-CCA
(1λ ) = |Pr[S3.0 ] − | = |Pr[b0 = b] − |.
A
2
2
Game 3.1: This game is the same as Game 3.0, except the
decryption oracle.
• Decryption Query(i, j, C): Given index i of a sender, j of
a receiver and a ciphertext C, the oracle retrieves tuples
(T , H2 (T )) from List L2 with T = (C1 kC2 kC3 kC5 k·).
For each tuple it computes (M kα) ← H2 (T ) ⊕ C4 , and
returns M if (pkj3 )α = C3 and
skj1 ·H1 (M )

3

(C1 ⊕ H3 (ê(C5 , pkT2 )skj ))H1 (M ) = gα · pki

.

If no tuple satisfies the conditions above, it returns ⊥.
Obviously, the probability that A correctly gets the output of
H2 without asking the oracle is negligible. So we have:
|Pr[S3.1 ] − Pr[S3.0 ]| ≤ negl(1λ ).
Game 3.2: It is the same as Game 3.1, except the generation
of C1∗ . In this game C selects a random element W6∗ ∈ GT ,
computes C1∗ as
α

∗

C1∗ = g H1 (Mb ) · gr
α

∗ ·s∗

∗

⊕ H3 (W6∗ ),

∗ ∗

and adds (W6∗ , C1∗ ⊕ (g H1 (Mb ) · gr ·s )) to List L3 .
Denote by E2 the event that A queried (ê(pkT1 , pkR4∗ )β ) to
H3 hash oracle. Game 3.2 is identical to Game 3.1 if E2 does
not occur. So we have
|Pr[S3.2 ] − Pr[S3.1 ]| ≤ Pr[E2 ].
Due to the intractability of BDH problem, it is hard for A to
∗
compute ê(gw , f )β . Therefore, we have that
Pr[E2 ] ≤ negl(1λ ).
Game 3.3: This game is the same as Game 3.2, except the
generation of C1∗ :
α

∗

C1∗ = g H1 (Mb ) · gr

∗ ·s∗

⊕ W7∗ .

A random string W7∗ is used to replace H3 (W6∗ ) in the generation of C1∗ . Since W6∗ is random, the output of H3 is also
random. Therefore, the change does not make difference to
the advantage of A. We have that
Pr[S3.3 ] = Pr[S3.2 ].
Game 3.4: We modify the game again. Now C simply sets
C1∗ as a random element W8∗ of length lg . So we have
Pr[S3.4 ] = Pr[S3.3 ].
Next we show that A wins in Game 3.4 with probability only
negligibly larger 1/2.
Lemma 1: Pr[S3.4 ] is negligibly larger than 1/2 if DBDH
assumption holds.
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Proof of Lemma 1: Assuming that event S3.4 happens
with probability ε + 12 in Game 3.4. We build an algorithm B
to break DBDH assumption.
Given a DBDH instance (G1 , G2 , GT , p, ê : G1 × G2 →
y y
GT , g1 , g2 , gx1 , g1 , g2 , gz2 , Z ), where x,y,z are random elements of Z∗p , and Z is either equal to ê(g1 , g2 )x·y·z (i.e. b̂ = 0)
or a random element (i.e. b̂ = 1). B aims to output a guess b̂0
of the bit b̂. Consider the following game.
• Setup: A submits the index R∗ of its challenge
receiver. B generates and sets system public parameter pp = (G1 , G2 , GT , p, g = g1 , h = g2 , f =
gz2 , ê, H1 , H2 , H3 ), nS key pairs of senders (pkSi , skSi ),
nR key pairs of receivers (pkRi , skRi ), and a key pair
of the tester (pkT , skT ). Specially, B sets pkR∗ =
∗
∗
y y
(pkR1∗ , pkR2∗ , pkR3∗ , pkR4∗ ) = (gr , g1 , g2 , gv ), skR∗ =
(skR1∗ , skR2∗ ) = (r ∗ , y, v∗ ) while y is unknown to B. B
sends pp, {pkSi }, {pkRi } and pkT to A.
• Phase 1: A is allowed to issue queries as in Game 3.4.
• Challenge: A specifies a challenge sender S ∗ and two
challenge message M0∗ and M1∗ of the same length. B
R

randomly selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, selects α, β ←
R
Z∗p and W8∗ ← {0, 1}lg , computes and returns C ∗ =
∗
∗
∗
(C1 , C2 , C3 , C4∗ , C5∗ ) to A, where
C1∗ = W8∗ ,
C4∗
C5∗

=
=

∗ ·α

C2∗ = ht·α , C3∗ = hw

,

(Mb∗ kα) ⊕ H2 (C1∗ kC2∗ kC3∗ kC5∗ kZ ),
gβ = gx1 .

Phase 2: A continues to issue queries as in Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a bit b0 , and wins the game if b0 = b
and
1) R∗ was not issued as a key query;
2) (·, R∗ , ·) was not issued as a decryption query;
3) neither (·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, R∗ , ·) nor (·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, R∗ )
was issued as a test query.
0
If b = b, B returns b̂0 = 0 representing that Z is not a
random element, and 1 otherwise.
If Z = ê(g1 , g2 )x·y·z = ê(pkR2∗ , f )β (i.e. b̂ = 0), we have
•

•

C4∗ = ((Mb∗ kα) ⊕ H2 (C1∗ kC2∗ kC3∗ kC5∗ kê(pkR2∗ , f )β ).
Hence, C ∗ is a real ciphertext of Mb∗ , and the view of A is
identical to a real attack (according to Game 3.4). Otherwise
(i.e. b̂ = 1), Z is a random element. Thus, ciphertext C ∗
contains no information about Mb∗ , and the probability that
A wins the game is only 1/2. The advantage that B breaks the
DBDH assumption is then
AdvDBDH
(1λ )
B
1
= |Pr[b̂0 = b̂] − |
2
1
= |Pr[b̂0 = 0 ∧ b̂ = 0] + Pr[b̂0 = 1 ∧ b̂ = 1] − |
2
1
1
1 1 1
ε
= | · (ε + ) + · − | = .
2
2
2 2 2
2
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If ε is non-negligible, so is AdvDBDH
(1λ ). Therefore, we have
B
1
|Pr[S3.4 ] − | ≤ negl(1λ ).
2
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Combining the claims above, we have that:
1
AdvDT-CCA
(1λ ) = |Pr[S3.0 ] − |
A
2
1
≤ |Pr[S3.1 ] + negl(1λ ) − |
2
1
λ
≤ |Pr[S3.2 ] + negl(1 ) − |
2
1
λ
= |Pr[S3.3 ] + negl(1 ) − |
2
1
λ
= |Pr[S3.4 ] + negl(1 ) − |
2
≤ negl(1λ ).
This completes the proof.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

In this section, we compare the computation and communication costs our PKEET scheme with some other related
schemes. Furthermore, we do experiments to demonstrate the
practicality of our scheme.
The second to the sixth rows of Table 1 show the comparison in terms of computational complexity of key generation,
encryption, decryption, authorization and test algorithms,
respectively. The comparison in terms of communication
complexity of public key, secret key, ciphertext and trapdoor
is then given in the next four rows, respectively. Security
of the schemes is compared in the eleventh to the twelfth
rows. The last three rows indicate whether the schemes
need dual-server setting, support designated tester and resist
OMRA, respectively.
As shown in Table 1, our scheme requires less computational overhead in authorization, but more in key generation, encryption, decryption and test algorithms. However,
FG-PKEET+ scheme and TS-CCA-FA scheme are based
on the dual-server setting, which inevitably requires two
servers to transmit messages to each other during the test
process, the cost of which could not be neglected. Therefore,
dual-server based PKEET schemes should require more running time in practical applications. It is worth noting that the
schemes with group mechanism, e.g. G-IBEET [28], need
to create a group for each comparison and set up group
administrator, which reduces the operability of the scheme.
Although G-IBEET scheme seems to be more computationally efficient, users need to encrypt the data multiple times
for comparing with different users, which is inconvenient
in practice. In addition, these related schemes do not support designated tester, while our scheme does, thus further
improving security.
We implemented three PKEET schemes secure against
OMRA without group mechanism: FG-PKEET+ scheme [9],
TS-CCE-FA scheme [26] and our scheme. The experiments
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TABLE 1. Comparison of schemes.

FIGURE 3. Efficiency comparison of Enc.

FIGURE 5. Efficiency comparison of Aut.

FIGURE 4. Efficiency comparison of Dec.

FIGURE 6. Efficiency comparison of Test.

are based on Java Pairing Based Cryptography (JPBC)
Library [34], and executed on a host machine which has a
quad-core 2.50GHz Intel i7-6500U CPU and 8 GB memory,
and runs Windows 7 pro OS. We used Type A pairing
constructed from elliptic curve y2 = x 3 + x over the field Fp .
Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 show the computational costs of
Enc, Dec, Aut and Test algorithms of the three schemes,
respectively. (TS-CCE-FA scheme does not have decryption algorithm.) TS-CCE-FA scheme supports three types
of authorization. Since the other two types are used for
ciphertext-specific comparisons, we chose TS-CCE-FA with

type-I authorization for comparison, which is more similar
with our scheme. As TS-CCE-FA scheme provides the private
key directly as the output of authorization algorithm, requiring almost no time in trapdoor generation, however, it can
only achieve IND-CPA security, while our scheme achieves
CCA-type security.
Notice that in these figures we only count the computational costs of the algorithms. Communication costs between
the two servers in FG-PKEET+ and TS-CCE-FA are not
counted. Thus, efficiency of our scheme is comparable to
the other two schemes, and even would be more efficient in
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TABLE 2. Part of DRG codes and titles [36].

FIGURE 7. Classification of patients into DRG [35].

the test process if we take into account communication cost,
which is usually the most frequently executed algorithm in
practice. Furthermore, our scheme achieves security against
OMRA without resorting to the dual server setting, thus providing higher security guarantee. Therefore, we believe that
our scheme is more appropriate in applications like diagnostic
related groups, which is explained in the next section.
VII. APPLICATION

Figure 7 shows the classification process of diagnostic related
groups (DRG). All possible principal diagnoses are first
divided into 25 mutually exclusive principal diagnosis areas
referred to as MDC (Major Diagnostic Categories), and then
divided into specific DRG. Each MDC is constructed to
correspond to a major organ system (e.g. respiratory system,
circulatory system, digestive system) [35].
As the scenario shown in Fig. 1, our PKAE-DET scheme
can be used in medical systems such as DRG system. Below
is an example.
The hospital initializes the system and generates public
parameters pp. The third-party cloud server, acting as the
tester, runs KeyGenTester to generate (pkT , skT ) and publishes its public key pkT . Each doctor runs KeyGenSender to
generate his key pair (pkS , skS ). Similarly, each patient runs
KeyGenReceiver to generate his own (pkR , skR ). After the doctor diagnoses the patient, an electronic medical record M =
{M1 kM2 kM3 kM4 k · · · } = {Circulatory SystemkCoronary
Bypasskwith Cardiac Catheterizationkwithout MCCk . . .} is
generated, then encrypted with his secret key skS , the patient’s
public key pkR and tester’s public key pkT , in the form of C =
{C1 kC2 kC3 kC4 k · · · } = {Enc(M1 )kEnc(M2 )kEnc(M3 )
kEnc(M4 )k · · · }, and uploaded to the cloud server. Patients
VOLUME 7, 2019

download their medical records C from the cloud and decrypt
them locally.
The criterions of DRG, including diagnoses, procedures,
age, sex, discharge status, and the presence of complications
or comorbidities, are encrypted into C 0 = {C1 0 kC2 0 kC3 0 k
C4 0 kC5 0 kC6 0 kC7 0 kC8 0 kC9 0 kC10 0 k . . .} = {Enc(Respiratory
System)kEnc(Circulatory System)kEnc(Digestive System)k
Enc(Coronary Bypass)kEnc(Cardiac Defibrillator Implant)k
Enc(with Ptca)kEnc(with Cardiac Catheterization)kEnc
(without Cardiac Catheterization)kEnc(with MCC)kEnc
(without MCC)k . . .} (The order is determined by medical
institution) and uploaded to cloud server.
Patient and medical institution generate their
authorizations Td and Td 0 for cloud server respectively. With
authorization, the cloud server is able to match an encrypted
electronic medical record C of the patient with the encrypted
criterions C 0 by running the test algorithm and return the
matching results to the medical institution. Specifically,
the cloud server returns the criterion index corresponding
to the patient’s medical record, such as the indices of C2 0 ,
C4 0 , C8 0 and C10 0 . According to Table 2, because of the
existence of Enc(Circulatory System), the range is limited to
MDC 05. The range is further limited to 231-236 under MDC
05 according to the existence of Enc(Coronary Bypass).
The existence of Enc(with Cardiac Catheterization) and
Enc(without MCC) eventually determine the DRG to be
code 234. In the whole process, the cloud server does not
know what each index represents.
However, due to the limited amount of plaintext space
available for criterions, an authorized cloud server can generate a large number of fake medical records and compare them
with a patient’s real medical record to guess which disease
the patient has. Considering patients’ privacy, we hope that
during the search process, the cloud server cannot obtain
any additional information about patients’ medical records,
It requires to prevent the cloud server from illegally matching,
which is the security against OMRA, as mentioned above.
Therefore, our PKAE-DET scheme proposed in this paper is
applicable in the DRG application.
VIII. CONCLUSION

In this paper we proposed the notion of public key authenticated encryption with designated equality test (PKAE-DET),
136009
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which aims to resist offline message recovery attacks.
We proposed a concrete construction of PKAE-DET to
demonstrate its practicability, which do not require the dual
server setting nor any group mechanism. Our scheme is
shown to be secure under the given models based on some
simple mathematical assumptions. Experiments show that
our scheme is efficient, and could be deployed in cloud environment in practice. It could be used to support applications
like privacy preserving diagnostic related groups.
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